// Mobile App Pentesting — iOS · Android · Flutter · React Native

Securing Your App on
Every User's Device

Mobile applications run in untrusted client environments. CyberHQ reverse-engineers APKs and IPAs, bypasses SSL pinning and root detection via dynamic runtime instrumentation (Frida/Objection), and tests all backend APIs.

MASVS
OWASP Mobile Standard
iOS +
Android & Hybrid Frameworks
Dynamic
Runtime Frida Hooking
100%
Zero False Positives

Reverse Engineering,
Runtime Hooks & APIs

Unlike web applications where source code remains on the server, mobile binaries are downloaded directly by users. Attackers decompile them, extract hardcoded secrets, bypass biometric checks, and manipulate client runtime memory.

Decompilation & Reverse Engineering (JADX, Ghidra, Hopper, IDA Pro)

Dynamic Runtime Hooking (Bypassing SSL Pinning, Root/Jailbreak detection with Frida)

Insecure Local Data Storage (Shared Preferences, SQLite, Keychain, Keystore)

Inter-Process Communication (IPC) & Exported Component Exploitation

cyberhq@mobile-pentest:~$ frida -U -f com.target.app -l bypass.js

[*] Spawning target Android process: com.target.app...

[+] Hooking TrustManagerImpl.verify() — SSL Pinning Bypassed

[+] Rootbeer check bypassed: RootDetection() → return false

[*] Intercepting encrypted database keys in memory...

[CRITICAL] SQLCipher Master Key dumped from memory: 'k3y_982#x'

[CRITICAL] Biometric authentication bypassed via CryptoObject nullification

[HIGH] Insecure Deep Link enables unauthorized account linking

[✓] Mobile Dynamic Assessment Complete: 3 Critical Risks Found

// Execution Lifecycle

Mobile Application Pentesting Methodology

OWASP MASVS & Dynamic Runtime Instrumentation Workflow

PHASE 01 STAGE 1/5
jadx_decompiler — APK / IPA Analysis
[*] Decompiling classes.dex & manifest permissions...
[!] Hardcoded AWS Secret Key in BuildConfig.java
[INFO] Exported Activity: com.app.DebugPaymentActivity

Decompilation & Static SAST Audit

Decompiling application binaries, inspecting AndroidManifest / Info.plist permissions, identifying hardcoded API tokens, and auditing third-party SDKs.

JADX-GUIGhidraMobSFHopper
PHASE 02 STAGE 2/5
frida_agent.js — SSL Pinning & Root Bypass
[+] Hooking TrustManagerImpl.verify() -> return true
[+] Rootbeer root detection bypassed successfully
[*] Proxying encrypted HTTPS traffic to Burp Suite

Frida Dynamic Runtime Hooking

Hooking application functions dynamically in runtime memory on rooted/jailbroken devices to bypass SSL pinning, anti-tamper locks, and biometrics.

FridaObjectionXposedBurp Mobile Proxy
PHASE 03 STAGE 3/5
storage_dump.sh — Device Cache Audit
[CRIT] Unencrypted SQLite Database: /data/data/com.app/db.sqlite
[HIGH] Auth tokens logged to logcat in plaintext
[*] Dumping process RAM: User credentials retrieved

Local Storage & Memory Inspection

Inspecting device file caches, SQLite databases, shared preferences, iOS Keychain, and memory dumps for sensitive user data leakage.

SQLCipherKeychain-DumperFrida-Dumping
PHASE 04 STAGE 4/5
api_interceptor — Burp Suite Traffic
[*] Intercepting POST /api/mobile/v2/wallet/transfer
[CRIT] Negative amount accepted: Wallet balance debited backwards
[+] Zero server-side verification on client params

Backend API Interception & Logic

Testing backend endpoints called by the mobile application for broken object authorization, race conditions, and business logic flaws.

Burp Suite Mobile ProxyPostmanOWASP MASVS
PHASE 05 STAGE 5/5
keystore_patch.kt — Hardware Security
+ val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore")
[✓] Hardware-backed Secure Enclave key storage implemented
[✓] MASVS Level-2 Compliance Report Generated

Keystore Hardening & Free Retest

Providing concrete Android Keystore and iOS Secure Enclave code fixes to your mobile developers with a full verification re-test.

OWASP MASVS ScorecardCode Fixes30-Day Free Retest

Comprehensive Security Deliverables Included

Every engagement includes executive briefings, technical PoCs, code-level fix guidance, and a complimentary 30-day verification re-test.

Case Study: Healthcare Patient App

How CyberHQ found sensitive health records stored in unencrypted SQLite cache on 50,000+ Android devices.

// SCENARIO

Client Profile

A leading telemedicine and diagnostic provider in India launched an Android and iOS application allowing patients to consult doctors and download lab reports.

// VULNERABILITIES

What We Found

Biometric authentication could be bypassed with Frida in 2 seconds. The app cached medical reports in plaintext SQLite on world-readable external storage.

// RESULTS

Resolution

CyberHQ guided the engineering team to implement SQLCipher encryption with Keystore-backed key storage and hardware-backed biometric verification.

Schedule Your Mobile App Pentest

Send us your APK or TestFlight build. We provide comprehensive black-box and grey-box security assessments.